Religious Conversion, Transformative Experience, and Disagreement by De Cruz, Helen
Religious	conversion,	transformative	experience,	and	disagreement1	
	
Helen	De	Cruz,	Oxford	Brookes	University,	hde-cruz@brookes.ac.uk	
	
This	is	a	draft	version	of	a	paper	that	appeared	in	Philosophia	Christi,	vol	20	(1),	265-276	
	
	
1.	Religious	conversion	and	the	Independence	Principle	
	
Miguel	 and	 Catherine	 are	 both	 atheist	 philosophers	 and	 long-time	 friends	 from	
graduate	school.	Miguel	respects	Catherine	and	believes	she	is	his	epistemic	peer.	Both	
of	them	have	been	raised	in	a	liberal	environment	where	atheism	is	quite	widespread.	
But	they	have	also	carefully	thought	about	theism.	Neither	of	them	is	a	philosopher	of	
religion,	but	they	know	the	arguments	for	and	against	theism	and	they	both	agree	that	
the	 arguments	 against	 outweigh	 the	 arguments	 for.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 are	 quite	
complacent	atheists;2	they	think	there	is	no	serious	case	to	be	made	for	theism.		
Miguel	meets	Catherine	at	a	philosophy	conference—it’s	been	about	a	year	since	
they	 last	met.	He	has	been	 looking	 forward	 to	 seeing	his	old	 friend.	As	 they	 catch	up	
over	a	cup	of	coffee,	it	becomes	clear	that	Catherine	is	now	a	theist.		
“But	why?”	Miguel	 asks.	 “Didn’t	 you	 think	 all	 that	 theist	 philosophy	 is	 dubious,	
motivated	reasoning?”		
“I	changed	my	mind,”	Catherine	replies.		
This	 situation	appears	 to	be	a	 case	of	peer	disagreement.	Miguel	 and	Catherine	
are	(presumably)	equally	thoughtful	in	the	domain	in	question,	and	they	have	access	to	
the	 same	 evidence.	 While	 their	 epistemic	 situation	 is	 not	 identical,	 they	 will	 still	 be	
similar	 enough	 to	 take	 each	 other	 to	 be	 epistemic	 peers,	 a	 situation	 that	 occurs	
frequently	in	everyday	life.		
Epistemologists	have	debated	whether	one	should	conciliate,	that	is,	revise	one’s	
opinion	that	p,3	when	faced	with	a	disagreeing	peer	who	holds	that	not-p,	or	whether	
one	can	remain	steadfast.	One	principle	that	has	been	proposed	to	separate	these	two	
types	of	responses	is	the	Independence	Principle.		
	
Independence:	 In	 evaluating	 the	 epistemic	 credentials	 of	 another’s	
expressed	belief	about	p,	in	order	to	determine	how	(or	whether)	to	modify	
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my	 own	 belief	 about	 p,	 I	 should	 do	 so	 in	 a	 way	 that	 doesn’t	 rely	 on	 the	
reasoning	behind	my	initial	belief	about	p.4	
	
Independence	 delivers	 a	 plausible	 verdict	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 cases,	 such	 as	 Christensen’s	
paradigmatic	mental	math	case,	where	people	disagree	about	 the	amount	 to	pay	 in	a	
restaurant	where	they	are	splitting	the	bill.5	But	the	principle	might	not	apply	to	other	
cases.	An	example	 is	elementary	math,6	where	someone	you	consider	as	an	epistemic	
peer	says	that	2	+	2	=	5.	This	is	no	reason	to	lower	your	confidence	that	2	+	2	=	4,	but	
rather,	to	revise	your	belief	that	this	person	is	an	epistemic	peer,	at	the	very	least	about	
elementary	mathematical	 facts.	 If	 someone	 truly	 believed	 that	 2	 +	 2	 =	 5,	 this	 would	
demonstrate	that	this	person	is,	in	all	likelihood,	not	as	clear-headed	as	you.	
Would	 a	 religious	 conversion	 be	 more	 analogous	 to	 the	 mental	 math	 or	 the	
elementary	math	case?	Many	people	have	a	response	along	these	lines:	“I	don’t	know	
what	happened	to	Josh.	He	was	such	a	reasonable	guy,	but	then	he	joined	Scientology.	I	
think	he’s	gone	off	 the	cliff,”	or,	 “I	used	 to	 respect	Amy,	but	now	she	 is	no	 longer	an	
Evangelical	 Christian;	 I	 cannot	 respect	 her	 anymore.”	 In	 such	 cases,	 people	 treat	 the	
conversion	as	a	situation	where	one’s	epistemic	peer	has	acquired	such	an	outlandish	
set	of	beliefs	that	they	begin	to	doubt	the	peerhood,	akin	to	the	elementary	math	case.	
In	other	cases,	where	the	new	belief	is	at	least	a	live	option	(in	the	Jamesian	sense),	the	
case	may	appear	more	like	the	mental	math	case	(e.g.,	“I’m	not	Jewish,	but	it	does	look	
like	an	interesting	religion	with	a	rich	theology.	Yehuda	might	be	right,	or	I	might	be”).	
There	is	a	further	problem	for	treating	conversion	cases	as	peer	disagreements:	religious	
conversions	tend	to	be	transformative.	This	makes	it	hard	to	see	whether	the	person	is	
still	 one’s	 epistemic	 peer,	 or	what	 the	 proper	 response	 should	 be.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	
transformation,	the	beliefs	of	a	dissenting	peer,	arising	from	a	religious	conversion,	do	
not	have	straightforward	evidential	value.7	
	
2.	Conversion	as	a	transformative	experience	
	
Some	experiences	transform	us,	both	 in	who	we	are	and	what	we	know.	L.A.	Paul	has	
termed	 such	 experiences	 “transformative	 experiences.”8	 They	 are	 personally	
transformative,	in	that	they	change	who	you	are	as	a	person,	and	they	are	epistemically	
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transformative,	 in	 that	 they	 give	 you	 new	 information	 by	 virtue	 of	 a	 particular	
experience	 that	can	only	be	obtained	by	having	 that	experience.	Paul	has	argued	that	
we	 cannot	 rationally	 make	 decisions	 that	 will	 transform	 us	 because	 there	 is	 an	
asymmetry	 between	who	we	 are	 now,	 and	what	we	 know	 now,	 and	who	we	will	 be	
then.	 We	 cannot	 make	 a	 comparison	 between	 before	 and	 after	 to	 calculate	 the	
expected	utility,	 for	example,	adopting	a	 child	may	be	a	wonderful	experience	 for	my	
friend,	but	I	may	come	to	regret	 it.	Yet	we	often	make	life-changing	decisions:	moving	
country,	 getting	 married,	 or	 joining	 a	 religious	 denomination.	 Not	 all	 transformative	
experiences	are	the	result	of	conscious	decisions.	Becoming	long-term	ill	or	disabled	is	a	
situation	few	people	choose,	yet	it	transforms	what	they	know	(e.g.,	what	it	is	like	to	live	
in	 the	 face	of	 imminent	death),	and	who	 they	are	 (e.g.,	 someone	who	became	blind).	
The	transformative	nature	of	disability	 is	 illustrated	by	how	disabled	and	non-disabled	
people	think	about	their	quality	of	life:	sighted	people	tend	to	think	being	blind	is	a	lot	
worse	than	blind	people	think	it	is,	including	blind	people	who	were	previously	sighted.9		
Is	religious	conversion	transformative?	Saul/Paul’s	conversion	to	Christianity	on	
the	road	to	Damascus	suggests	that	a	single	transformative	event	can	lie	at	the	basis	of	
conversion.	As	recorded	in	Acts	9	(in	a	third-person	narrative)	and	the	Pauline	epistles	
such	 as	 Galatians	 1	 (in	 a	 first-person	 narrative),	 Saul	 of	 Tarsus	 was	 a	 Jew	 who	
persecuted	 the	 early	 Christian	 community.	 On	 his	 way	 to	 Damascus,	 where	 he	 was	
extending	 his	 mission	 to	 have	 Christians	 imprisoned,	 he	 had	 a	 dramatic	 religious	
experience:	he	saw	a	blinding	light,	and	heard	the	voice	of	the	risen	Christ,	who	asked	
him	why	he	was	persecuting	him.	Saul	then	got	baptized,	and	started	missionary	work	
for	 the	 nascent	 Christian	 Church.	 This	 account	 of	 conversion	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 single	
dramatic	 experience	 shaped	 subsequent	 discussions	 of	 what	 conversion	 is	 like,	 for	
instance	 in	 the	 work	 of	 early	 psychologists	 such	 as	 William	 James.10	 Subsequent	
research	 into	 religious	 conversions	 suggests	 a	more	 gradual	 pattern.	 Conversions	 are	
not	 single	 experiences,	 but	 rather	 the	 cumulative	 effect	 of	many	 smaller	 experiences	
and	 decisions.	 Even	 among	 people	 who	 self-identify	 as	 born-again	 Christians,	 the	
majority	 experience	 a	 gradual,	 rather	 than	 a	 sudden,	 conversion	 to	 Evangelical	
Protestantism.11	 Nevertheless,	 religious	 conversions	 transform	 a	 person’s	 system	 of	
beliefs	(thus	are	epistemically	transformative),	and	change	their	personality.	This	is	not	
so	 much	 a	 change	 in	 personality	 traits,	 but	 in	 goals,	 feelings,	 attitudes,	 and	 life	
meaning.12		
Given	 that	 a	 person,	 post-conversion,	 is	 both	 epistemically	 and	 personally	
transformed,	 it	becomes	difficult	 to	gauge	whether	a	 former	epistemic	peer	 is	 still	 an	
epistemic	 peer.	 For	 example,	 Jonathan	 Edwards	 has	 an	 extensive	 record	 of	 the	
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deepening	of	his	faith	in	several	phases:		
	
.	 .	 .	my	 sense	 of	 divine	 things	 gradually	 increased,	 and	 became	more	 and	
more	 lively,	 and	 had	 more	 of	 that	 inward	 sweetness.	 The	 appearance	 of	
everything	was	altered:	there	seemed	to	be,	as	it	were,	a	calm,	sweet	cast,	
or	 appearance	 of	 divine	 glory,	 in	 almost	 everything.	 God’s	 excellency,	 his	
wisdom,	 his	 purity	 and	 love,	 seemed	 to	 appear	 in	 everything;	 in	 the	 sun,	
moon,	and	stars,	 in	 the	clouds	and	blue	sky,	 in	 the	grass,	 flowers,	 trees,	 in	
the	water	and	all	nature;	which	used	greatly	to	fix	my	mind.13		
	
How	can	we	know	that	Edwards,	post-conversion,	is	in	an	epistemically	better	position	
than	before?	How	can	Edwards	himself	know	this	is	the	case?		
	
3.	Disagreement	with	one’s	former	self		
	
Conversion	 thus	 gives	 rise	 to	 two	 forms	 of	 disagreement—disagreement	 with	
one’s	former	self,	and	disagreement	with	friends	and	family.	Let’s	look	at	someone	like	
Catherine,	who	 is	 now	 in	disagreement	with	her	 former	 self.	 She	now	believes	 things	
she	would	have	found	implausible	just	a	year	ago.	Should	she	accord	more	credence	to	
her	new	beliefs?	If	conversion	were	solely	the	result	of	a	careful,	rational	deliberation,	it	
would	 seem	 proper	 that	 the	 convert	 is	 more	 confident	 about	 her	 beliefs	 post-
conversion.	However,	conversion	occurs	as	a	result	of	several	factors.	These	include	the	
desire	 to	 be	 of	 the	 same	 religious	 denomination	 of	 one’s	 family	 and	 friends,	 or	 the	
desire	for	self-improvement	and	for	having	a	religion	that	is	more	in	line	with	one’s	self-
image.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 qualitative	 study	 on	 French	 young	 adults	who	 converted	 to	
Islam,	several	people	mentioned	that	 they	believed	regular	prayer	and	observing	 food	
taboos	 and	 the	 Ramadan	 would	 help	 them	 be	 more	 personally	 disciplined.14	 Such	
concerns	may	be	practically	rational,	but	do	not	say	much	about	the	truth	or	falsity	of	
the	beliefs	one	adopts.		
The	 influential	 Lofland-Stark	model15	 of	 religious	 conversion	outlines	 two	basic	
conditions	 that	prompt	 religious	conversion:	 first,	persons	must	 feel	an	acute	need	or	
tension	 within	 their	 religious	 problem-solving	 perspective,	 and	 second,	 they	 form	
affective	 bonds	 with	 members	 of	 the	 new	 religion/affiliation	 they	 convert	 to,	 which	
facilitates	 the	 step	 to	 the	 new	 religious	 movement.	 This	 model	 has	 attracted	 much	
attention	in	the	social	study	of	religion.	More	recent	sociological	accounts	of	conversion	
identify	 two	 types	 of	 attraction	 of	 religious	movements	 to	 new	 converts:	 ideological,	
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through	offering	a	new	perspective	on	life,	and	social,	by	providing	a	satisfactory	social	
network.16		
	 Thus,	 conversion	 seems	 to	 be	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 result	 of	 irrelevant	 causal	
factors,	such	as	the	presence	of	social	groups	that	one	might	feel	at	home	with	and	seek	
closer	affiliation	with.	However,	one’s	original	religious	beliefs	(or	lack	thereof)	are	also	
largely	 the	 result	 of	 irrelevant	 influences.	 Vavova	 defines	 an	 irrelevant	 influence	 as	
follows:17		
	
An	irrelevant	influence	for	me	with	respect	to	my	belief	that	p	is	one	that	
(a)	has	influenced	my	belief	that	p	and	(b)	does	not	bear	on	the	truth	of	p.	
	
There	is	a	continued	debate	on	whether	 irrelevant	 influences	on	our	beliefs	can	act	as	
defeaters.	 This	 debate	often	 centers	 on	 the	question	of	whether	 our	 response	 to	 the	
evidence	allows	for	some	latitude,	as	permissivists	propose,	or	whether	a	total	body	of	
evidence	only	allows	for	one	rational	attitude,	as	proponents	of	uniqueness	hold.18		
If	 we	 assume	 that	 sociologists	 are	 right	 and	most	 conversions	 are	 caused	 by	 a	
mixture	 of	 social	 and	 personal	 factors,	 few	 of	 which	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 the	
beliefs,	how	should	a	convert	evaluate	her	past	self’s	beliefs?	Vavova	recommends	that	
in	order	to	evaluate	the	epistemic	significance	of	irrelevant	influences,	we	need	to	look	
at	 what	 causes	 these	 influences.	 If	 the	 influences	 give	 “good	 independent	 reason	 to	
think	 that	 you	 are	mistaken	with	 respect	 to	 p,	 you	must	 revise	 your	 confidence	 in	 p	
accordingly—insofar	as	you	can.”19	For	instance,	if	a	belief	is	the	result	of	brainwashing	
or	 wishful	 thinking,	 this	 does	 seem	 to	 present	 substantial	 higher-order	 evidence	 that	
undermines	 the	 belief.	 Extreme	 cases	 of	 conversion	 that	 involve	 indoctrination	 or	
coercive	force	would	thus	be	cast	in	a	negative	light,	as	indoctrination	and	coercion	are	
in	general	poor	belief-forming	mechanisms.	But	for	many	other	cases,	which	involve	the	
typical	 mixture	 of	 social	 factors	 and	 personal	 motivations,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 clear	 whether	
these	irrelevant	influences	provide	the	convert	with	a	good	independent	reason	that	she	
is	mistaken	with	respect	to	her	new	beliefs.	The	factors	underlying	conversion	cases	do	
not	 seem	 to	 be	more	 epistemically	 vicious	 or	 benign	 than	 factors	 underlying	 original	
religious	belief	formation	(e.g.,	parental	religious	affiliation).		
	 A	 religious	 convert	 has	 one	 piece	 of	 higher-order	 evidence	 that	 someone	who	
does	not	convert	does	not	possess,	namely	first-personal	experience	of	changing	one’s	
religious	 beliefs	 in	 a	 deep	 and	 significant	 way:	 the	 convert	 knows	 that	 her	 religious	
beliefs	can	be	changed.	This	is	in	addition	to	any	first-order	evidence	that	prompted	the	
conversion,	e.g.,	Paul’s	religious	experience	on	the	Road	to	Damascus.	(Note	that	not	all	
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conversion	 cases	 involve	 such	 first-order	 evidence;	 some	may	 be	 purely	 the	 result	 of	
social	factors	and	do	not	offer	any	first-order	evidence,	but	then	the	convert	still	has	the	
second-order	evidence	of	having	converted).	This	might	lead	a	convert	to	become	more	
accepting	and	open	to	the	religious	views	of	others	(after	all,	the	convert	had	different	
religious	 beliefs	 prior	 to	 her	 conversion).	 If	 Catherine	 now	 holds	 beliefs	 she	 found	
implausible	 just	 a	 year	 ago,	 this	 tells	 her	 something	 meaningful	 not	 just	 about	 her	
current	 religious	 beliefs,	 but	 about	 the	 fragility	 and	 revisability	 of	 religious	 beliefs	 in	
general.	 Thus	 it	 would	 seem	 rational	 for	 a	 convert	 to	 remain	 open	 to	 the	 views	 of	
dissenting	epistemic	peers.	By	contrast,	Miguel	does	not	have	the	relevant	experiences	
that	presumably	were	at	least	in	part	the	basis	of	Catherine’s	conversion.	Given	that	he	
has	not,	he	should	remain	open	to	the	possibility	that	Catherine	has	relevant	evidence	
that	he	lacks.	Thus,	conciliationism	seems	a	rational	response	in	the	light	of	conversion	
of	a	former	epistemic	peer.	I	will	look	in	more	detail	at	this	question	in	the	next	section.		
	
4.	Disagreement	with	a	recently	converted	peer	
	
I	will	now	look	at	the	question	of	what	(if	any)	epistemic	conclusions	Miguel	can	draw	
from	 Catherine’s	 conversion,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 further	 information	 (let’s	 assume	
Catherine	had	to	dash	to	the	airport;	so	Miguel	never	gets	to	hear	her	reasons).	Should	
it	 lower	 his	 confidence	 in	 his	 complacent	 atheism?	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 Catherine’s	
conversion	 does	 not	 provide	Miguel	with	 any	 new	 information.	Miguel	 is	 presumably	
aware	of	 the	distribution	of	opinions	about	 theism.	He	knows	 that	most	of	 the	world	
population	 (about	 85-90%)	 are	 theists	 (most	 of	 these	 are	 monotheists),20	 and	 that	 a	
substantial	number	of	academics	(albeit	still	less	than	50%)	are	atheists.21	He	might	also	
know	that	73%	of	academic	philosophers	are	atheists.22	Since	Miguel	shares	most	of	his	
background	beliefs	with	academic	philosophers,	he	would	probably	consider	them	to	be	
his	 epistemic	 peers.	Miguel	 could	maintain	 his	 credences	 accordingly.	 There	 does	 not	
seem	to	be	any	special	information	gained	by	an	old	friend	having	converted	to	a	belief	
he	does	not	share.		
However,	 Miguel	 has	 acquired	 one	 new	 piece	 of	 information:	 someone	 with	
whom	he	had	many	background	beliefs	in	common,	and	whom	he	has	always	respected	
as	 his	 epistemic	 peer,	 changed	 her	 mind	 on	 the	 question	 of	 theism.	 If	 he	 considers	
Catherine	 to	 be	 similar	 to	 him	 in	 many	 respects	 (e.g.,	 shared	 graduate	 school	
experience),	 they	 are	 similar	 in	 relevant	 background	 knowledge.	 Thus	 it	 would	 seem	
epistemically	 prudent	 for	 Miguel	 to	 at	 least	 follow	 up	 with	 Catherine	 (e.g.,	 a	 simple	
email	saying	something	like,	“Hey,	Catherine.	It	was	great	to	meet	up	with	you.	I	have	to	
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confess	 I	was	 a	 bit	 surprised	 that	 you’re	 a	 theist	 now.	 Could	 you	 tell	me	more	 about	
it?”).	Maybe	Catherine	has	reasons	that	Miguel	has	not	properly	considered.		
	 There	 is	 another	 reason	 why	 the	 conversion	 of	 a	 friend	 who	 was	 (at	 least	
previously)	 an	 epistemic	 peer	 is	 significant:	 we	 tend	 to	 attach	 more	 weight	 to	 the	
testimony	of	those	who	are	close	to	us	than	to	the	testimony	of	strangers.	Maybe	this	is	
because	 we	 can	 gauge	 the	 epistemic	 credentials	 of	 familiar	 individuals	 better.	 But	
familiarity	alone	does	not	explain	the	extra	weight	we	accord	to	those	near	and	dear	to	
us.	 After	 all,	 if	 that	 were	 the	 case,	 we	would	 put	more	 stock	 in	 former	 friends	 or	 in	
frenemies,	and	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	(indeed,	we	tend	to	be	more	cautious	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 both	 categories).	 Being	 friends	 engenders	 epistemic	 partiality.23	
Already	very	young	children	show	the	tendency	to	value	the	testimony	of	people	close	
to	 them	 more	 than	 the	 testimony	 of	 strangers.24	 This	 heuristic	 makes	 sense	 in	 the	
context	 of	 epistemic	 vigilance:	 since	 we	 not	 only	 need	 to	 sort	 out	 accurate	 from	
inaccurate	 testifiers,	but	also	 those	who	are	 truthful	 from	deceitful,	 it	makes	sense	 to	
trust	people	who	are	well	 disposed	 toward	us.	 Thus	people	have	a	 tendency	 to	place	
selective	trust	in	people	they	see	as	benevolent:	people	with	whom	we	have	a	trusting	
relationship	are	less	likely	to	deceive	us.25		
	 Trust	 in	friends	may	also	be	valuable	beyond	purely	epistemic	reasons,	 just	 like	
self-trust	is	intrinsically	valuable.26	Some	feminist	epistemologists	have	emphasized	the	
value	of	certain	kinds	of	partiality:	 intellectual	 theorizing	should	not	be	seen	as	purely	
dissociated	from	our	emotional	lives.27	For	such	reasons,	Miguel	should	be	more	diligent	
in	 following	 up	 Catherine’s	 reasons	 for	 converting.	 And	 perhaps	 likewise,	 Catherine	
should	be	diligent	 in	 following	up	with	Miguel	 to	explain	her	 reasons	 for	 converting.	 I	
will	now	 look	at	a	case	study	of	conversion	that	will	 illustrate	why	reasoned	debate	 is	
the	proper	response	to	a	friend’s,	and	one’s	own,	conversion.		
	
5.	Rational	argument	and	conversion	
	
The	African	theologian	and	church	father	Augustine	of	Hippo	(354–430)	converted	from	
Manichaeism	to	Christianity.	In	both	religious	traditions,	he	was	an	apologist,	a	teacher,	
and	 an	 evangelist.	 The	 letter	 De	 Utilitate	 Credendi	 (The	 Usefulness	 of	 Belief)28	 is	
addressed	 to	 Honoratus,	 a	 student	 friend.	 Augustine	 converted	 his	 friend	 to	
Manichaeism	with	much	difficulty,	and	 in	 the	 letter	set	himself	 the	unenviable	 task	 to	
try	to	convince	his	friend	to	convert	to	Christianity.	But	why	should	Honoratus,	whom	he	
previously	 persuaded	 of	 the	merits	 of	Manichaeism,	 now	 trust	 Augustine?	 As	 Asiedu	
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writes,		
	
For	Augustine	to	achieve	his	purposes,	Honoratus	would	have	to	be	persuaded	
of	 Augustine’s	 trustworthiness	 while	 discounting	 Augustine’s	 much	 earlier	
evangelistic	campaigns	as	a	Manichee.	Honoratus	would	also	have	to	grant	that	
Augustine	himself	had	not	been	deceived	a	second	time	as	he	appears	to	have	
been	misled	the	first	time	when	he	was	persuaded	by	the	Manichees.29		
	
	 The	 letter	 is	 revealing	 in	 that	 Augustine	 does	 not	 point	 to	 his	 own	 conversion	
experience	as	a	source	of	knowledge,	as	he	does	elsewhere	(e.g.,	 in	his	Confessions).30			
Rather,	the	letter	focuses	on	biblical	hermeneutics	(the	discrepancies	between	the	Old	
and	 New	 Testaments,	 which	 Manicheans	 often	 pointed	 out	 as	 reasons	 to	 reject	
Christianity)	 and	 on	 high-level	 epistemological	 principles	 such	 as	 trust	 and	 credibility.	
The	letter	focuses	on	the	reasons	Manicheans	gave	for	rejecting	Catholic	doctrines,	and	
argues	that	these	reasons	were	mistaken.	In	this	way,	Augustine	argues	that	Honoratus’	
(and	his	former	self’s)	reasons	for	accepting	the	Manichaean	doctrine	were	mistaken:		
	
Well,	they	harangued	at	great	 length	and	with	great	vigour	against	the	
errors	of	simple	people,	which	I	have	since	learned	is	extremely	easy	for	
anyone	to	do	who	is	moderately	educated;	and	if	they	taught	us	any	of	
their	 own	 doctrines	we	 thought	we	must	maintain	 it	 because	 nothing	
else	occurred	to	us	to	set	our	minds	at	rest.31		
	
The	 passage	 in	 viii,	 20	 recounts	 Augustine’s	 own	 faith	 journey	 (what	 born-again	
Christians	would	call	their	“testimony”).	He	first	reveals	that	he	was	already	“in	a	state	
of	serious	doubt”	about	Manichaeism	when	he	last	parted	from	his	friend,	and	that	his	
doubt	 grew	 even	more	 after	 he	 saw	 the	 underwhelming	 performance	 by	 the	 famous	
Manichean	Faustus.	“You	remember,	his	coming	to	explain	all	our	difficulties	was	held	
out	to	us	as	a	gift	from	heaven.	Well,	I	recognized	that	he	was	no	better	than	the	others	
of	the	sect,	except	for	a	certain	eloquence	he	had.”32		While	Augustine	does	not	use	his	
own	conversion	as	a	source	of	evidence	to	Honoratus,	he	nevertheless	presents	it	as	a	
model	that	Honoratus	can	emulate.	For	example,	he	draws	close	parallels	between	his	
own	former	doubts	(now	happily	resolved),	and	Honoratus'	present	doubts.	This	echoes	
the	 conciliationist	 position	 in	 the	 epistemology	 of	 disagreement,	where	 the	 beliefs	 of	
others	we	respect	as	our	peers	provide	significant	evidence	(in	part	because	our	peers	
may	 have	 reasons	 or	 arguments	 we	 may	 not	 have	 considered	 properly),	 and	 where	
these	beliefs	call	for	belief	revision.	
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The	 letter	 (particularly	 sections	 vii–xi)	 develops	 an	 intricate	 philosophy	 of	
testimony,	where	Augustine	asserts	that	all	knowledge	must	begin	in	trust	of	those	who	
have	proper	authority,	rather	than	in	reason.	He	gives	the	example	of	the	trust	we	place	
in	our	parents:		
	
.	.	.	how	will	children	serve	their	parents	and	love	them	with	mutual	dutifulness	if	
they	do	not	believe	that	they	are	their	parents.	That	cannot	be	known	by	reason.	
Who	 the	 father	 is,	 is	 believed	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 mother,	 and	 as	 to	 the	
mother,	 midwives,	 nurses,	 slaves	 have	 to	 be	 believed,	 for	 the	 mother	 can	
deceive,	being	herself	deceived	by	having	her	son	stolen	and	another	put	in	his	
place.33		
	
To	 Augustine,	 the	 chief	 problem	 with	 Manicheans	 is	 that	 they	 do	 not	 recognize	 the	
importance	of	trust	in	testimony	of	those	who	have	proper	authority.	Instead	they	hold	
up	 a	mirage	 of	 how	we	 should	 acquire	 beliefs:	 “they	 promise	 to	 give	 to	 those	whom	
they	attract	a	reason	even	for	their	most	obscure	doctrines.”34	Thus,	they	are	not	being	
intellectually	honest	with	their	adherents	and	converts,	because	it	is	simply	not	possible	
to	 give	 reasons	 for	 obscure	 doctrines,	 without	 resorting	 to	 trust	 in	 authoritative	
testifiers.35		
In	De	Utilitate	Credendi	Augustine	sees	testimony	merely	as	a	basis	of	belief.	In	
his	Confessions	(397-401)	he	also	regards	it	as	a	basis	for	knowledge.36	Yet,	in	the	former	
he	clearly	sees	testimony	as	a	precondition	for	knowledge,	as	many	people	would	lack	
the	 relevant	 reasoning	 skills	 to	 work	 out	 religious	 truths	 for	 themselves.	 Augustine	
draws	an	illuminating	parallel	between	friendship	and	trust	in	testimony.	Against	those	
who	do	not	think	that	testimony	can	be	a	useful	source	of	belief,	Augustine	argues,	“I	do	
not	see	how	anyone	who	accepts	that	as	true	can	ever	have	a	friend.	For	 if	 to	believe	
anything	is	base,	either	it	is	base	to	believe	a	friend,	or	without	such	belief	I	cannot	see	
how	anyone	can	go	on	 speaking	about	 friendship.”37	While	 it	 is	not	explicit,	 it	 is	 clear	
that	Augustine	here	is	appealing	to	his	friend	to	read	his	arguments	with	more	charity	
and	 patience	 than	 he	 would	 read	 the	 arguments	 from	 a	 Catholic	 writer	 he	 does	 not	
know,	 namely	 with	 the	 charity	 one	 owes	 a	 friend.	 The	 tone	 throughout	 the	 letter	
underlines	this	point,	with	Augustine	frequently	expressing	understanding	at	what	must	
be	 a	 surprise	 to	 his	 friend,	 for	 example,	 “You	 are	 amazed,	 I	 am	 sure.	 For	 I	 cannot	
pretend	that	I	was	not	formerly	of	a	very	different	opinion”;38	he	frequently	anticipates	
objections	 Honoratus	 might	 have,	 such	 as,	 “But	 you	 will	 probably	 ask	 to	 be	 given	 a	
plausible	 reason	why,	 in	 being	 taught,	 you	must	 begin	with	 faith	 and	not	 rather	with	
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reason.”39	
Overall,	De	Utilitate	Credendi	shows	a	good	model	of	peer	disagreement	 in	the	
face	of	 conversion.	Augustine’s	 aims	 in	 the	 letter	 are	modest.	 As	 he	points	 out	 in	 his	
closing	 paragraphs,	 he	 does	 not	 refute	 the	 Manichean	 doctrines	 or	 defend	 Catholic	
ones.	Rather,	he	aims	to	show	that	the	arguments	that	Manicheans	have	offered	against	
Catholic	 doctrines	 (namely,	 alleged	 discrepancies	 between	 the	 Old	 and	 New	
Testaments)	 are	 not	 as	 strong	 as	 he	 previously	 believed.	 He	 also	 argues	 that	
Manicheism	does	not	live	up	to	its	own	standards	of	belief	based	on	reason,	rather	than	
testimony—a	standard	that	Augustine	also	demonstrates	to	be	unattainable.	Along	the	
way,	 Augustine	 can	 also	 demonstrate	 to	 himself	 (as	 he	 also	 did	 at	 length	 in	 his	
Confessions)	that	he	 is	now	in	a	better	epistemic	position	than	his	pre-conversion	self.	
Even	 though	 Augustine	 may	 not	 be	 justified	 in	 thinking	 he	 now	 holds	 the	 correct	
doctrines,	 his	 new	 beliefs	 are	 based	 on	 more	 sophisticated	 grounds,	 whereas	 his	
previous	reasons	for	rejecting	Catholic	doctrines	proved	to	be	inadequate.		
	
6.	Conclusion	
	
The	case	of	religious	conversion	presents	a	series	of	difficulties	for	traditional	accounts	
of	epistemic	peer	disagreement,	because	conversion	is	a	transformative	experience:	it	is	
difficult	to	compare	whether	a	convert	is	in	a	better	epistemic	position	post-conversion.	
Conversion	 is	 rarely	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 rational	 decision	 process,	 but	 the	 result	 of	
irrelevant	causal	factors	such	as	the	religious	views	of	friends	and	personal	tension.	This	
was	almost	certainly	the	case	for	Augustine,	as	we	can	see	 in	passages	throughout	De	
De	 Utilitate	 Credendi,	 for	 example,	 “When	 I	 departed	 from	 you	 across	 the	 sea	 I	 was	
already	in	a	state	of	serious	doubt;	what	was	I	to	hold;	what	was	I	to	give	up?	Indeed	my	
hesitation	grew	greater	day	by	day	 from	the	 time	 that	 I	heard	 the	 famous	Faustus.”40	
Most	 cases	of	 conversion	are	not	 caused	by	 forces	 that	are	more	pernicious	 than	 the	
ones	that	gave	rise	to	the	original	set	of	beliefs	(e.g.,	beliefs	of	one’s	parents).	Given	that	
both	self-trust	and	trust	in	friends	is	valuable	(for	epistemic	and	non-epistemic	reasons),	
it	does	not	seem	wrong	to	accord	prima	facie	weight	to	a	friend’s	new	set	of	beliefs,	if	
one	 saw	 this	 friend	 as	 an	 epistemic	 peer	 prior	 to	 conversion.	 Rational	 argument	 and	
dialogue,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 Augustine,	 can	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 evaluating	 peer	
disagreement	caused	by	conversion.	It	not	only	helps	one’s	friends	to	critically	evaluate	
their	beliefs,	but	also	allows	the	convert	to	critically	reflect	on	her	own.	 
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